Herbert at the Battle of Loos
Prelude
On the morning of the battle, the regiments of the reserve 21st and 24th Divisions were still in the area of Noeux-les-Mines, still some way from the front. Due to the heavy losses of the frontline Divisions early on the 25th, the reserves were required much sooner than anticipated and so they had to up and march a few hours more to reach the front line at Loos. They would have had to manoeuvre through the lines of wounded streaming back from the morning's attack, across a battlefield churned up by fours days of bombardment.
Loos itself was a small mining village. The main slag heap is very clear in this picture from 1915, the distinctive pylons of the winding gear being known to the troops as Tower Bridge:
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| courtesy of Paul Reed, www.battlefields1418.com |
The dispatches of Sir John French, Commander in Chief of the British forces, state:
The general plan of the main attack on the 25th September was as follows: - In co-operation with an offensive movement by the 10th French Army on our right, the 1st and 4th Corps were to attack the enemy from a point opposite the little mining village of Grenay on the south to the La Bassee Canal on the north. The Vermelles-Hulluch Road was to be the dividing line between the two Corps, the 4th Corps delivering the right attack, the 1st Corps the left. In view of the great length of line along which the British troops were operating it was necessary to keep a strong reserve in my own hand. The 11th Corps, consisting of the Guards, the 21st and the 24th Divisions, were detailed for this purpose. This reserve was the more necessary owing to the fact that the 10th French Army had to postpone its attack until one o'clock in the day; and, further, that the Corps operating on the French left had to be directed in a more or less south-easterly direction, involving, in case of our success, a considerable gap in our line. To ensure, however, the speedy and effective support to the 1st and 4th Corps in the case of their success, the 21st and 24th Divisions passed the night of the 24th/25th on the line Beuvry (to the east of Bethune) - Noeux les Mines.
These reserve Divisions were the first contingent of Kitchener's much vaunted New Armies and much was expected of them, in spite of (or, by some parties, because of) their inexperience. As it turned out, the exhausted and mismanaged regiments were not to have an easy time during the battle.
From the extensive description of the battle at The Long, Long Trail:
24th September, 7pm: the two reserve Divisions of XI Corps begin their final 7-mile march to the battle area, but are constantly delayed by road traffic and halts at level crossings. A military policeman stops some units moving through Bethune, as they were without passes. The reserve divisions were warned to carry extra rations as it may be some time before their cookers caught up with them. They also carried greatcoats on the march to the battle area.
The battle commences
This recording of a Lance Corporal of D Company, 1/6th Bn London Regiment, 47th Div, describes the tactical briefing for the attack.
From The Long, Long Trail again:
25th September, 5.50am: heavy British bombardment hits German front line defences and cloud gas is released [this battle was notable for the Allies' first use of poison gas, in this case chlorine]. The gas forms a 30 to 50 feet high blanket, moving forward slowly in places (although still short of the enemy positions at 6.25am), but is virtually standing still in the British assault positions in other areas.
British infantry from the 47th (1/2nd London) Division advancing into a gas cloud during the Battle of Loos. The white puffs would be from shrapnel shells. Later on the same day the 8th East Yorks also passed this way.
6.00am: the now tired reserve Divisions complete their assembly at Noeux-les-Mines and Beuvry.
6.30am : Zero Hour. All assaulting infantry units move out from front lines and move across no man's land towards the enemy positions
[...]
3.00pm: 8/East Yorkshires and 10/Yorkshire ["Green Howards"] of 62nd Brigade, 21st Division, are ordered forward towards Loos, to reinforce the units of 15th Division and if necessary retake Hill 70. After coming under shrapnel fire as they marched in column of fours - which destroyed their transport - these battalions lost direction and ran into intensive machine gun fire from the Southern end of Chalk Pit Copse, sustaining very heavy casualties
[More details of this unfortunate route mixup are given further below]
7:30pm: Other reserves of 21st Division - expected by Division to have been available at 10.30am - finally arrived and were clearly exhausted. They were ordered to reinforce the line between Hill 70 and Puits 14 bis [east of Loos and just south of Chalk Pit Wood]. Around 8.30pm, the remnants of the first waves that had attacked in the morning were finally relieved on the slopes on Hill 70. Nightfall therefore saw both Divisions [15th and 21st] in this sector in scratch positions between the old German first and second lines, consolidating their position. The enemy was in possession once again of the dominant height of Hill 70.
View 8th East Yorks 1915 and 7th Borders 1915 - 1917 in a larger map
Noeux-les-Mines and Loos, 25/9/15, 11am
Moved from billets – halted for an hour and at 3pm launched the attack at enemy from BETHUNE – LENS Road – The direction was for Hill 70 thro' LOOS East and over the slack heaps – We came under heavy artillery fire at 3pm and so moved in artillery formation – D Coy led the attack with C on the left B & A in support. On arriving in the village of Loos [their costly detour via Chalk Pit Copse - see below for more details - seems to have been ignored in this official account] Col B.I. Way was met by the Brig Gen of 145 Bde apparently on account of the obstacles when coming over the enemys trenches the Battalion was straggled out. Col Way led on to the SE side of the village and formed up about a company & a half - Shells of all classes were falling very thick around and several casualties occurred – D Coy and part of C under Col Way crossed the slack heap & commenced entrenching C Coy & part of B & about a company of the 10th York organised by the Adjt lined up and moved forward on the right – Major Ingles 2nd in Command formed up the two reserve companies in Loos and went up to the slack heap and commenced communication trench – at 8pm the Bn was in line digging in – Companies were re-organized - 10 York R on our right – Col Way commanding the left of the Bn & Major Ingles on the Slack Heap. All the night machine gun fire from the right flank and shells made entrenching difficult – 2 small counter attacks were easily repulsed during the night.
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| Positions at Loos at midnight of 25th September (from The Long, Long Trail) |
(At this time the enemy held the redoubt and the crest of Hill 70, with what was left of 46 Bde and some other intermingled units holding a line just below the crest)An eye-witness account on the Western Front Association site gives a good idea of the march from the coast and the chaos and conditions between Loos village and Hill 70. The author was with the 12th Northumberland Fusiliers, also part of the 62nd Bde, 21st Division.
Around 6pm GOC 15th Div ordered one Bn from 62 Bde [possibly the 8th East Yorks or 10th Yorks but most likely a different 62 Bde battalion that hadn't yet been in action, i.e. the 12th or 13th Northumberland Fusiliers] to move up and be placed under 46th Bde at hill 70. The rest of the Bde to be in reserve. Around 9pm he then received orders to attack hill 70 with 62 Bde and the rest of 15th Div at 9am on the 26th, this in spite of continued requests for reinforcements and the fact that 46 Bde for example had suffered nearly 75% casualties.
‘About 11pm the 13th Northumberland Fusiliers (62nd Brigade) were sent up to relieve the 46th. It Lost its way, but, fortunately, was met by Colonel Purvis (12th HLI) in Loos and knowing the orders, he guided it into its allotted position.’
Despite continued effort the attack the next day failed.
8th East Yorks and 10th Green Howards take the wrong route
As mentioned above, it appears that on the afternoon of the 25th these two battalions were not only subjected to a shrapnel barrage as they crossed the last exposed crest in the road before the British and German front lines, but mistakenly carried on along the same road instead of bearing left and taking a more straightforward route through Loos to their assigned section of the battlefield.
The earlier instructions to the battalion commanders had been brief:
We do not know what has happened on Hill 70. You must go and find out: if the Germans hold it, attack them; if our people are there, support them; if no one is there, dig in.
The Webmatters site gives a good description of the movements of the 62nd Brigade on the afternoon of the 25th September:
At 1500 hours (on 25th September still) the 8th Bn East Yorkshire Regiment and 10th Bn Green Howards [Yorkshire Regiment] set out for Hill 70. Their maps were inadequate for the task and as they marched down the Béthune – Lens Road they had no real idea as to the direction they should be going.
Instead of turning in towards Loos for directions the two battalions continued along the main road towards Chalk Pit Copse. Here they ran into the 1/20th Bn London Regiment (47th Division) who tried to prevent them from continuing beyond the front line.
The two battalions had already come under shrapnel fire on the way up (which had destroyed the transport section) and were now sent reeling by machine gun fire from the southern half of the copse. Retreating to the Londoners the two battalions were gainfully employed holding the front; digging trenches and hunting down any straggling Germans still lurking about Loos village.
Whilst this was happening General Wilkinson had arrived at Loos village with his other two battalions the 12th and 13th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers. These were sent forward to relieve those units that had not already been so. A company of the 12th Bn went out to the Scots’ defensive trench at Hill 70 where they were mistaken for a full relief by the 9th Black Watch and 10th Gordons who had been in the thick of the fighting for much of the day. By 2300 hours the Scots and withdrawn.The same web site shows the route of the "8 E YORKS and 10 G H" on the afternoon of the 25th and their positions early on the morning of the 26th. Note the blue arrow in the bottom left corner. The two battalions started their attack from the north east of the village but - as described above - went too far right, towards Chalk Pit Copse, before correcting and moving through Loos to cross the slag heap towards Hill 70:
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| Positions on the morning of 26th September (from Webmatters WW1 site) |
Reforming cautiously, the two battalions pushed on looking for Hill 70. Without guides or detailed maps to direct them the Yorkshiremen advanced across country heading for the high ground they believed to be Hill 70.
Before long they came across Lieutenant-Colonel Hubback's 1/20th London Battalion, which was holding a communication trench to the north of Chalk Pit Copse. The St. Pancras men watched in dismay as the two battalions casually went forwards towards the enemy occupied copse. Lt-Col Hubbuck tried to stop the impending disaster:
"About 5.00pm ... the 8th Bn. EAST YORKSHIRE REGT and 10th Bn. YORKSHIRE REGT came through the line we were holding. I was able to stop some of the senior officers and ask them where they were going. I was told that they had been told to take LOOS and occupy HILL 70; they appeared to have no definite orders or any idea as to the direction of HILL 70. I told a senior officer of the 8th EAST YORKS (I think the C.O.) the direction of HILL 70 and also that LOOS had been occupied by the 47th Division since that morning ...
From what I can gather from the officers the orders they had received were most indefinite, they appeared to have no maps and certainly no idea of localities."
Despite Hubback's remonstrations, the East Yorkshires and the two leading companies of the Green Howards marched blindly forward up the slope. As they approached Chalk Pit Copse heavy machine-gun fire opened up, sending the Yorkshiremen reeling back towards the London held trench. The disaster was compounded when the rear companies of the Green Howards, who were waiting in reserve at the foot of the hill, saw the survivors falling back. In the failing light, they mistook their comrades for Germans and opened fire. For a time Lt-Cols Hadow and Way were powerless to stop their men from killing each other. As darkness fell order was finally restored and the battalions reformed.Orders for any battle or action tended to be extremely detailed regarding the objectives and locations, so it certainly sounds like the inexperience or ineptitude of the two battalions' senior officers were to blame for the confusion.
It should also be remembered that this was the first action in the war for both battalions.
Another factor could have been that the Bethune-Lens road had a spot height of 70 metres marked on the maps, quite close to the German front lines and the "Stützpunkt 69" on the map above. This might explain why they insisted on staying on this road instead of taking a route through Loos to their intended objective, the real Hill 70.
Herbert is wounded
Some time between the 25th and the 26th September, Herbert suffered a gun shot wound to his abdomen.
The initial entry in his records had said that he was killed in action on the 26th but this was later corrected when it was reported that he had arrived at the 47th Division's 6th London Field Ambulance on the 28th and died of his wounds on the 29th.
This implies that he could have been wounded on the 25th during the fateful march towards Chalk Pit Copse, which was in that sector of the battlefield assigned to the 47th Division. Another possibility was that he was wounded on the 26th on Hill 70, as this is where the 8th East Yorks were later in action with the rest of the 62 Brigade of the 21st Division.
In either event, it seems that something delayed his arrival at the Field Ambulance until the 28th. It's possible that he spent two or three days in no-mans land until he could be recovered.
The following days
From the 8th East Yorks war diary again:
Loos, 26/9/15, 10am
Lt. Col Way with a party of 120 E York Rgt and a few of the London Rgt & a few Northb Fus [Northumberland Fusiliers] made an attack on Hill 70 - the enemy's trenches were however reached, but the flank fire from mch guns on the left & shells made the Bn withdraw. At 11am the slack heap was heavily shelled and Col Way was wounded ordered a slight retirement to the village - heavy casualties from snipers & machine guns occurred and Major Ingles with Capt Moon's A Coy kept on the slack heap and held their position - Part of the Bn retired at 4:30pm & joined support trenches of 23 Londons W of the village and remained all night - Shelling by the enemy continued all night
Loos, 27/9/15
A & B Coys held on the slack heap until relieved by the London & Gordons at 4pm the shelling was incessant particularly during the relief at 6:30pm the Bn was formed up in Bivouac at SAILLY LABOURSE. Rain was falling throughout the engagement.
A roll was called and the Casualty list made for the 3 days action
Officers killed 4. Injured 1 Officer
Officers wounded 11. Gassed 1 Officer
Officers missing 1. Wounded & [illegible] 1 Officer
Other ranks Killed 21. Gassed 1.
Other ranks wounded 132. Gassed & [illegible] 1
Other ranks missing 131. Died of Wounds 1
Bethune, 28/9/15
The Brigade entrained and marched to Rest Camp to be refitted.
Aftermath
This 1960s photo shows the view from the top of Hill 70, with Puits 14bis and Chalk Pit Wood in the middle distance. This would have been the view over to the left of the advance:
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| courtesy of Paul Reed, www.battlefields1418.com |
In the end the 8th East Yorks suffered 320 men killed or wounded in this battle at a time when the typical strength of a battalion was 650-750.
The poem "The Guards Came Through" by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle depicts the march and actions of the Guards Division on this area of the battlefield, between Hill 70 and Chalk Pit Wood. As the reserve division of the XI Corps, they had relieved the shattered 21st and 24th Divisions on the afternoon of the 26th September.
The war correspondent Philip Gibbs gave his critical view of the command of the XI Corps and their handling of the reserve divisions at the Battle of Loos in Part 3, Section XIII of his book, "Now It Can Be Told" (Project Gutenberg)
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