Other units at the 2nd Battle of the Scarpe, 23rd April 1917

Dispositions and objectives for the 51st Brigade and 7th Borders

The action south of the Scarpe was part of a much larger engagement along a 9-mile front in the Arras area.

In addition to the usual daily diary entries, the 7th Borders' "WAR DIARY for the month of APRIL 1917" contains:

• the 7th Borders' copy of the "51st INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION ORDER No 155" issued on 22nd April and giving the overall objectives and roles for the constituent battalions
• their copy of the "ADDENDUM TO 51st INFY. Bde OPERATION ORDER NO 155"
• the 7th Battalion's own "OPERATION ORDER No 77" which gave in great detail the day's objectives, troop deployments and tactical actions
• a trench map of the PELVES area, based on recent aerial photos
• a sketch based on the above map

From those documents it's possible to get a fairly detailed picture of what was planned for the early morning of the 23rd April and the hours to follow:

• South of the River Scarpe, between the river and Monchy le Preux, the 17th Division's 51st Brigade had as its objective a Brown Line about 2km to the east and a Blue Line 1 km further on from that. A preliminary objective was a trench system across their advance, about 400m from the front line. A creeping barrage would be laid down ahead of the advance and two tanks had been assigned to help with the attack on Pelves. 
• Elements of the 51st Division north of the Scarpe and the 29th Division south of the 17th Division were also to advance eastwards. 
• Within the 51st Brigade of the 17th Division, the task of leading the attack was with the 7th Borders on the right flank and the 8th South Staffordshires on the left. The 10th Sherwood Foresters and 7th Lincolnshires were to push through to the Blue Line once the former regiments had reached and taken the Brown Line.
• Opposing the 51st Brigade were the 17th, 18th and 23rd Infantry Regiments of the 3rd Royal Bavarian Division. See also p.81 of the Histories of two hundred and fifty-one divisions of the German army which participated in the war (1914-1918).

More details on the actions of the 7th Borders on 23rd April, including maps, can be found on the page for Redford Bell.

Tactical considerations

With such a broad front, care had to be taken about the advance of friendly units to the left and right. A unit that advanced too far ahead of those on its flanks could be cut off or surrounded.


For the companies within the 7th Borders and the 8th South Staffs, the liaison between them would have been relatively simple. However, between the left flank of the 8th South Staffs and the right flank of the 51st Division was a small lake, the River Scarpe and the German-held north bank of the Scarpe. Visual contact with the 51st Division would have been next to impossible.

The attack would be supported by the tried and tested method of a preliminary artillery barrage of the enemy lines with a further "creeping barrage" which would stay 50-100 yards ahead of the expected positions of the advancing troops. One important purpose of the barrage was to cut holes through the lines of defensive barbed wire, as without these gaps the infantry would be held up.

As it transpired, the German positions on the north bank of the Scarpe were not taken in time and the barbed wire had not been dealt with adequately, both leading to fatal consequences for many men of the 51st Brigade.

8th South Staffs on the left flank, also south of the Scarpe

On the Borders' left flank, the 8th South Staffordshires had a similar experience. This account is taken from a blog posting on the Great War Forum, based on material from the 8/South Staffs war diary for 23rd April and the book "The True and Faithful Men - Pelsall Servicemen in the Great War":

As the clock ticked past midnight and on towards 2 a.m., 51st Brigade of the 17th (Northern) Division, led by 8th South Staffordshire and 7th Border Regiment, were moving steadily into the assembly trenches near Railway Triangle. By 3:30, the infantry was in place, waiting for the artillery bombardment that duly commenced at 4:45 a.m. However, it appears that the enemy had spotted the front-line build up and, as the wire was largely uncut, they were easily able to train their heavy machine guns on the few gaps. The battalion war diary for 23rd April makes clear the hopelessness of the assault. “Two minutes after the barrage began, the first wave advanced under heavy machine gun fire from the left flank [those positions across the river weren't even planned to have been reached by the 51st Division until zero hour plus 19, i.e. 17 minutes later]. 4:55 a.m., ‘A’ Company was in support but all officers had been killed or wounded, so the leaderless companies withdrew. They reorganised and two more attacks were made at 5:10 and 5:30, firing from the hip, yet machine gun fire stopped the attack. At 5:40, the battalion was withdrawn. The remainder was reorganised into three companies to occupy the assembly trench and to dig in. 7:30, 7/Lincolns tried to attack but failed. For the remainder of the day the South Staffs and Lincolns reorganised and dug in under a barrage of 5.9’s.” The butcher’s bill was horrific, as Jonathan Nicholls recounts, “7/Border lost 15 out of 19 officers and 404 out of 505 other ranks. 

8/S.Staffords’ attack was also a bloody shambles. 7/Lincolns were sent in without artillery support and were slaughtered, losing 200 men in five minutes.” Horace Green was one of the many from that terrible day that were never found – the 5.9’s later in the day not only hampered the reorganisation of the survivors but also covered the remains of the dead.

Actions just north of the River Scarpe

The 51st (Highland) Division, on the north bank of the River Scarpe, had the 154th Brigade attacking south of the railway line and north of the river.

The 154th Bde made some progress into the village of Roeux but German counter attacks, supported by accurate artillery bombardment, were very effective and by the end of the day only the western outskirts of the village remained in British hands. After the war, German accounts of the battle commented on the failure of the British troops in this sector to resist counter attacks, even when carried by small groups of German troops.

From the HISTORY OF 51st (HIGHLAND) DIVISION, page 163:

The plan of action for the operation was that the 17th Division should attack south of the Scarpe, and that the 37th Division should continue the attack to the left of the 51st. Objectives were selected as follows : — 

• The first objective, known as the Black line, was a line running west of the Roeux- Gavrelle Road, excluding the buildings of the chemical works and the village of Roeux. 
• The second objective, the Blue line, included the western half of the village of Roeux, the chemical works, and the Roeux-Gavrelle Boad. 
• The third objective, the Brown line, took the line of the road running due north from the eastern end of Roeux, and included all the remaining trenches of the German front system. 
• The fourth objective, the Red line, included Hausa and Delbar Woods and Plouvain Station.
• The final objective, the Pink line, included Plouvain. 

The 154th Brigade was detailed to attack on the right, the 153rd Brigade on the left.

The 154th Brigade had a particularly difficult operation to perform, as the frontage available for the assembly of their troops was considerably narrower than the frontage to be attacked. The attacking fines had therefore to expand laterally as the advance progressed, so as to cover the whole of the frontage allotted to them.

The number of guns available for the barrage appeared inadequate for an operation of this nature. It was anticipated that, as the enemy was practically without dug-outs to which he could be driven by the approaching barrage, he would have no other alternative but to remain in his shell-holes and fight.

To ensure success, it was therefore considered necessary to provide a barrage sufficiently dense to sweep the whole area to be attacked with shrapnel bullets. However, ad- ditional guns could not be spared readily, while attendant circumstances made it imperative that the attack should be carried out without delay.

The attack was launched at 4.45 a.m. on 23rd April, and developed into perhaps the most savage infantry battle that the Division took part in. Attacks continued through- out the day, followed by a succession of determined counter- attacks on the part of the enemy. Both sides sustained serious losses, and many positions changed hands several times in the twenty-four hours.

The main attack was delivered by the 153rd Brigade, the 7th Black Watch being on the right, the 7th Gordon Highlanders on the left. In rear of these two battalions, the 6th Gordon Highlanders, temporarily attached to the 153rd Brigade, were on the right, and the 6th Black Watch on the left. The plan was for the two leading battalions to seize the Black, Blue, and Brown lines, while the 6th Gordon Highlanders passed through to the Bed line. The 6th Black Watch were to consolidate a line running due north from the left flank of the 6th Gordon Highlanders in the Red line.

As soon as the infantry moved forward, a heavy machine- gun fire was opened on them, followed in a few minutes by the German artillery barraging the ground in rear of our assembly trenches. The left of the attack at first proceeded satisfactorily. The 7th Gordon Highlanders repeated their success at Beaumont Hamel. Their left company captured the Black line, according to programme, and killed a number of Germans in it ; the second wave passed through them and reached the Blue line, though in very reduced numbers. Only five of this company answered the roll at the end of the operations. The right company of the 7th Gordon Highlanders occupied the Black line, and the left platoon of the second wave entered the Blue line. The remainder of this battalion were held up between the Black and Blue lines, where, incidentally, they captured seventy-six prisoners.

The 7th Black Watch were held by machine-gun fire in front of the Black line, and could not get forward.

On the right the position of the 154th Brigade remained obscure. It is certain that at one time they were well in Roeux Wood and towards Roeux village, as the bodies of Highlanders were found in those places when the Division subsequently occupied Boeux. This brigade also captured the Black line, in spite of considerable opposition, and killed a number of Germans there.

More information and pictures can be found at:

• https://oxfordshireandbuckinghamshirelightinfantry.wordpress.com/tag/the-51st-division-war-sketches/
• http://archive.org/details/timeshistoryofwa14londuoft

ON April 23, 1917, the 9th Royal Scots took part in an attack on Roeux. Advancing along the side of the river Scarpe, with Roeux Wood on the right and Mount Pleasant Wood on the left, they were held up at the edge of the wood. With the assistance of a tank, however, they took the trench which was impeding the advance, together with a number of prisoners. The drawing below shows the men rising from "Creek Trench" to attack "Crump Trench," where the enemy were stubbornly holding out. Monchy is in the distance with the area of operation of the 7th Borders in the middle ground. Names of Men appearing in the Sketch.--- Coy. Sergeant-Major D. Walker; Corporal J. Hanna; Privates R. Jameson and C. Arnott.

Plate 42 from the 51st Division War Sketches by Fred A. Farrell

ON April 23, 1917, the 6th Gordons attacked the Chemical Works. At the outset they had to move over a tract of ground commanded by enemy machine-gun fire from Greenland Hill. Very heavy casualties were suffered, the Commanding Officer and Adjutant both being wounded. Small parties, however, continued to press on independently, and, after heavy fighting, succeeded in reaching the Chemical Works and driving out the enemy.Between April 1917 and September 1918 the Chemical Works changed hands many times, but in September 1918 the Germans were finally ejected, this time also by the 6th Gordons, in the final great advance to the Canal du Nord. Names of Officer and Men appearing in the Sketch:--- Captain Ralph Risk, M.C.; Corporal D. Denoon; Lance-Corporal J. Wright.

Plate 32 from the 51st Division War Sketches by Fred A. Farrell